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1 Introduction
Recent emergence of electronic commerce and Internet market places has improved consumers’ search-
purchase technologies relative to visiting physical stores. Consumers go online and comparison shop
between hundreds of vendors with much less effort than using Yellow Pages or newspaper advertise-
ments. Online consumers are price sensitive.1 Evidence shows these information technologies have also
altered firms’ price setting behaviors and the market structure: Bailey [1998] finds Internet retailers
change prices more frequently than traditional retailers; Brynjolfsson and Smith [2000] observe that
e-retailers make price changes that were up to 100 times smaller than those made by bricks-and-mortar
sellers; Latcovich and Smith [2001] find the online book market is more concentrated, at 93% in the
US, than traditional book retail industry, at only 45%. The objective of this paper is to explore the
macroeconomic implications of consumers’ search technologies.
I study the consequence of inflation on firms’ price setting and search market behaviors. Be´nabou
[1988] establishes an important channel through which expected inflation can impact on the market
structure and price setting behaviors of firms who face menu costs of changing nominal prices: an
increased price dispersion, arising from inflation, increases consumers’ willingness to search for a low
price, which in turn reduces monopoly power of firms and induces exit from the market. In the present
paper, I generalize Be´nabou’s model to study the role of consumer search technology play in the effects
of inflation.
For the formulation of consumers’ search technologies, I follow from Burdett and Judd’s [1983] noisy
sequential search model, where the probability q1 that one search elicits exactly one price quotation
determines the equilibrium outcome.2 Assuming 0 < q1 < 1, I study a situation in which more (or
less) efficient consumer search technology implies a larger (or smaller) number of price quotations a
consumer observes on average during one search.
In this setup, I show that there exist two different types of equilibrium: in the first type of
equilibrium firms’ pricing strategies are bounded by price competition among firms, whereas in the
second type of equilibrium firms’ pricing strategies are bounded by consumers’ search. If consumers’
search technologies are more efficient, it is likely that consumers observe a larger number of other
firms’ price. Thus, a firm expects more price-sensitive consumers and more elastic demand. In this
case, price competition binds firms’ price setting and the first type of equilibrium emerges. Conversely,
if consumers’ search technologies are less efficient, a firm expects demand to be less elastic. In this
case, consumers’ search binds firms’ price setting and the second type of equilibrium emerges.
Within this framework, the effect of inflation depends on the type of equilibrium and thereby
on consumer search technology. A greater price dispersion, arising from an increase in the rate of
1See Ellison and Ellison [2001], Goolsbee [2000] and Goolsbee and Chevalier [2002].
2They show without inflation and price adjustment costs that the unique equilibrium outcome is: (1) monopoly
outcome if q1 = 1; (2) competitive outcome if q1 = 0; (3) price dispersion if 0 < q1 < 1.
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inflation, makes consumers less price sensitive and mitigates competition among firms in the first type
of equilibrium. On the contrary, a greater price dispersion makes consumers more willing to search for
a low price and imposes a greater pressure from consumer search on firms’ pricing in the second type of
equilibrium. Therefore, an inflation is more likely to increase monopoly power of firms and stimulate
entry when consumers’ search technologies are more efficient, but to decrease monopoly power and
induce exit when consumers’ search technologies are less efficient.
This result fills an important gap in the existing literature: Assuming q1 = 0, Fishman [1992] shows
that Bertrand undercutting implies a positive relationship between inflation and monopoly power of
firms; Assuming q1 = 1, Be´nabou [1988] shows that consumer search implies a negative relationship
between inflation and monopoly power of firms. Assuming 0 < q1 < 1, my result shows that the
former (or latter) case is more likely to emerge when consumers observe a larger (or smaller) number
of price quotations on average during search.3
Further implication of the result is that although an improved search technology increases the
amount of competition among firms, it might not benefit consumers under long lasting inflation.
Intensified competition, driven by an improved search technology, generates a prolonged inflationary
period of gradual increases in real prices. This further implies a long-lasting duplication of resource
costs to extract monopoly rent. Hence, the result suggests that a tension might exist for policy
prescriptions between controlling price inflation and monopoly power of firms.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 setups of the model. Section 3 shows existence
and characterization of equilibrium. Section 4 presents numerical results on comparative statics of
the model. The model delivers empirical implications that are consistent with the existing evidence.
Section 5 discusses these issues and concludes. All the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Overview
The model is built on the framework constructed by Be´nabou [1988], so it is useful to review his model
briefly. Be´nabou considers a monopolistically competitive market with consumer search. There are
three main ingredients. First, the economy is characterized by constant inflation. Firms incur real
(menu) costs in adjusting nominal prices. The optimal price adjustment strategy of individual firms
is a staggered (S, s) policy: a firm waits until its real price reaches some lower bound, s, whereupon
it instantaneously resets its nominal price so that its real price returns to the upper bound, S > s.
3Other related works are Be´nabou [1992] that generalizes the baseline model by introducing heterogeneous search
costs, and Diamond [1993] that provides an alternative model, a sticker price model, where a firm cannot change the price
of goods already in inventory. In my model, search costs are homogeneous and there is no difference in price-adjustment
costs between the goods newly produced and the goods in inventory.
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These individual price policies determine in aggregate the market price distribution. Second, facing
the market price distribution, consumers incur real (search) costs to become informed of the individual
prices. The optimal strategy of consumers is the reservation rule: they accept any price no greater
than a reservation price. Finally, entry and exit of firms occur till the net profits of the operating
firms are driven down to zero. Thus, firms’ free-entry determines the density of firms per consumers.
In the present paper, I allow for consumers’ search technology to be stochastic which is taken
as deterministic in Be´nabou’s model. In particular, I allow for consumers to observe more than one
price. The consumers’ search-purchase behaviors in aggregate constitute a stochastic demand curve.
Because consumers might observe the other firms’ prices, individual firms face a competitive pressure
even when the consumers’ search reservation price does not bind their pricing policy. This mechanism,
which is absent in Be´nabou’s model, allows me to study the influence of consumers’ search technology
on firms’ pricing policies and price competition under inflation.
2.2 Basic setup
Time is continuous, denoted by t and lasts forever. The market consists of a continuum of identical
firms and consumers. Denote by µ ∈ (0,∞) the ratio of consumers to firms. µ will be determined
endogenously later by free-entry of firms. Firms are long-lived and produce a homogeneous good which
requires a fixed cost h > 0, and a constant marginal cost c > 0. These are real costs. Firms post
nominal prices for the good. Nominal prices are eroded at the constant inflation rate g > 0. Each
nominal price-adjustment entails a fixed real cost β > 0. There is no capacity constraint, so that firms
can satisfy all the forthcoming demand at the price they post.
At each moment in time, a new set of short-lived consumers enters the market to purchase one
unit of the good. Consumers search for the best price. Search is costly and requires real costs γ > 0.
I will be more specific about the consumers’ search technology shortly.
Following Be´nabou [1988, 1992], I focus my attention on a stationary and symmetric equilibrium
which has the following properties: All firms follow the identical staggered (S, s) price policy, that is,
a firm keeps its nominal price unchanged for an interval T > 0 until its real price reaches a trigger
value s > 0, whereupon it instantaneously resets its nominal price so that its real price returns to
a target value S > s, which is optimal given consumers’ search rule; Consumers search rule, which
is represented by a reservation price r > 0, is optimal given the firms’ (S, s) price policy; the ratio
of consumers to firms µ > 0 is determined by free entry of firms. Further, it is important to note
that when all firms follow the identical staggered (S, s) price rule with a constant inflation, the only
time-invariant distribution of real prices is log-uniform. Hence in a stationary-symmetric equilibrium,
the market price distribution F (p) satisfies:
dF (p) =
d ln p
ln(S/s)
(1)
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for all p in (s, S]. Under this distribution, aggregate nominal prices grow at the rate g > 0, which
keeps the aggregate consistency and the stationarity of individual firms’ (S, s) price strategies.4
2.3 Consumers’ Search
Given the market price-distribution F (p), I shall begin with consumers’ problem. Consumers know
the distribution of prices, F (p), but need to become informed of which firm is charging which price.
For how consumers obtain information about the individual prices, I will follow from a model of noisy
sequential search developed by Burdett and Judd [1983].5 In particular, I allow for the number of
price quotations per search, denoted as n, to be a random variable. Following their setup, I assume a
sample contains at least one price offer, i.e., n ≥ 1. I also assume that n follows a Poisson distribution
Pr[n = k] = e
−λλk
k! . Consumers do not know how many price quotations they observe ex ante, but do
know that they arrive at the rate λ on average. λ is an exogenous parameter. For a higher value of λ,
one search elicits a larger number of price quotations on average, thus a higher value of λ represents
a more efficient search technology of consumers.
The objective of consumers is to minimize the expected cost of purchasing one unit of the good.
Notice that because a sample might contain more than one price quotations, consumers will buy at the
lowest price they observe. Hence, consumers face the distribution of the lowest price that they expect
to observe during one search conditional on n ≥ 1. Let J(p) denote this conditional distribution.
Lemma 1 Suppose consumers observe n ≥ 1 price quotations during one search that follows a Poisson
distribution with mean λ. Given F (p), the distribution of the lowest price consumers observe is given
by the closed form expression:
J(p) =
1− e−λF (p)
1− e−λ .
J(p) is a non-decreasing function of p and satisfies limJ(p) = 0 as p→ s and J(S) = 1, where S (or
s) is the upper (or lower) bound of the market price distribution F (p).
The distribution J(p) on which consumers base for search-purchasing decision depends on λ and
the market price distribution F (p). Note J(p) is constant over time and known to consumers. Given
J(p), the optimal strategy for consumers is determined by a reservation price, r: a consumer continues
searching until she/he finds a price no greater than r.6 If r denotes the lowest price observed to date,
4See Caplin and Spulber [1987] for a proof. Be´nabou [1989] shows if firms follow a randomized (S, s) strategy to limit
storage by speculators, then any initial distribution of real prices converges to the log uniform steady-state distribution.
Bhaskar [1992] shows staggered pricing equilibria are stable when multidimensional strategic interactions among firms
are taken into consideration.
5For a dynamic version of noisy sequential search model, see Burdett and Coles [1997].
6Implicit here is that the first sample is free so that all consumers carry out the searching activity whenever they have
willingness to purchase. Recall problems are irrelevant once resources spent on search are assumed to be negligible relative
to consumers’ income. Further, I make the standard assumption that the search is instantaneous and consumption cannot
be postponed. See Be´nabou [1988, 1992] for more detailed discussion.
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the consumer is indifferent between accepting the price r and searching for another sample. Formally,
r satisfies:
γ =
∫ min[S,r]
s
(r − p) dJ(p). (2)
The L.H.S. of this equation represents the marginal cost of search, whereas the R.H.S. represents the
marginal expected gain. Any consumer’s search-purchasing decision is thus characterized by his/her
reservation price r. γ is common to all consumers, hence they have the identical reservation price r.
I assume a high consumption value of the good relative to search costs. From this it follows that it is
the search reservation price, not the consumption value, that matters to firms’ pricing strategies.
2.4 Profits
Given the consumers’ search rule described above, the next step is to derive firms’ expected profits.
From the standpoint of individual firms, consumers’ stochastic sampling implies that a random number
of consumers observe their price. Specifically, each firm receives µλ consumers on average at each
moment in time. If a given firm has a real price p in F (p) at some point in time, then let D(p) define
the expected number of sales the firm makes at that time. Note D(p) is time-invariant. The firm
makes no sales when its price is greater than r, hence D(p)=0 for p > r. For p ≤ r, because any given
consumer might observe more than one price, the firm can sell to the consumer only when its price is
the lowest among prices that she/he observes. The following lemma computes D(p).7
Lemma 2 Given F (p) and the consumers’ search reservation price r, the instantaneous expected
number of sales faced by a firm that has a price p is given by
D(p) =
{
0 if p > r
µλe−λF (p) if p ≤ r.
The expected number of sales of a firm is decreasing in p ≤ r. This is because there is a possibility
that a consumer who observes the firm’s price may also observe the other firms’ price and thereby it
is more likely that the firm sells to the consumer if its price is lower. Given D(p), the corresponding
instantaneous expected-profits of a firm that has a real price p in F (p) is given by Π(p) = (p− c)D(p).
Note Π(p) is stationary. Π(p) has the following important property.
Lemma 3 The instantaneous expected-profit function Π(p) is strictly quasi-concave in p.
As shown in the next subsection the strict quasi-concavity of Π(p) ensures the uniqueness of the (S, s)
price policy.
7Similar demand functions are in Wilde [1977], Butters [1977], and Stahl [1989].
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2.5 (S, s) price policy
The objective of a firm is to maximize its total discounted expected profits by choosing its nominal
price. Given a continuum of firms, an individual firm’s price has no influence on the entire price
distribution in the market. With a constant inflation g > 0 and a positive price-adjustment cost
β > 0, individual firms face a tradeoff between the cost of adjusting its nominal price and the cost of
letting inflation erode its real price. Sheshinski and Weiss [1977] show that the optimal price strategy
of a firm who faces such a tradeoff is the (S, s) type: a firm keeps its nominal price unchanged until its
real price p depreciates to a trigger value s whereupon it increases the nominal price so that p reaches
a target value S > s.
Denote by S′, s′ a real price band of a firm. Then, the total discounted expected profits of a firm
pursuing a stationary (S′, s′) price rule, just prior to the first price change, defines:
V (S′, s′) = −β +
∫ T ′
0
Π(S′e−gt)e−ρtdt+ V (S′, s′)e−ρT
′
,
where T ′ ≡ ln(S′/s′)/g denotes the duration of time that nominal price remains fixed, and ρ > 0
denotes the discount rate. The firm’s problem is to select the level of real prices S′ and s′ so as to
maximize V (S′, s′). The optimal solution is unique and satisfies the following conditions.
Lemma 4 Given F (p) and the consumers’ search rule, the optimal (S′, s′) price policy of a firm
satisfies
S′ ≤ r (3)
and the first-order conditions,
Π(S′)−Π(s′)− ρβ = 0 (4)
Π(s′)− ρV (S′, s′) = 0. (5)
Further, the solution to the first-order conditions satisfies the second-order conditions and is unique.
Firm expects no sales during the time that its real price is greater than the consumers’ reservation
price p > r. Thus, the optimality of (S′, s′) policy requires S′ ≤ r. Equations (4), (5) are the standard
first order conditions. The expected gains from delaying a price adjustment are the expected profits
just prior to the adjustment, which is equal to Π(s′), plus the interest on adjustment costs, ρβ, whereas
the expected loss from such a delay is the expected profits just after the price adjustment Π(S′). These
expected gains and losses are equated at the optimum as stated in condition (4). The change in real
price drives the marginal expected profits during the price cycle T ′ to zero on average as stated in
condition (5).8 Lemma 3 guarantees that the optimal solution to the first order-conditions is unique.
8Integrating V (S′, s′) by parts in equation (5) leads to
∫ T ′
0 Π
′(S′e−gt)e−(ρ+g)tdt = 0.
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In symmetric equilibrium, an individual firm’s optimal policy (S′, s′) must coincide with the other
firms’ price rule (S, s). Hence, the equilibrium value of real price band (S, s) satisfies the first-order
conditions (4), (5).
2.6 Entry
Following Be´nabou [1988, 1992], I allow for the density of firms per consumer 1/µ to be determined
endogenously by free entry. This is the final requirement for a monopolistically competitive equilib-
rium. Entry and exit occur until the firms operating in the market earn zero expected net profits, just
to cover fixed costs in equilibrium.
ρV (S, s) = h (6)
Since firms cover all costs, they are willing to operate and satisfy demand. It would be useful to mention
here the role played by entry and exit of firms. Consider for example a situation in which fixed costs h
gets higher. Then, some firms exit from the market and the average market share µλ of the remaining
firms increases given values of λ. This implies that for any given price p, the instantaneous expected
profit for the remaining firms Π(p) increases in response to exit of firms. This process continues until
the corresponding value ρV (S, s) covers the fixed costs h as expressed in equation (6).
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Market equilibrium
Definition 1 A symmetric steady-state equilibrium in this economy is consumer search reservation
price r > 0, a pair of real prices S, s > 0, the market distribution of real prices F (p), and the density
of firms operating in the market 1/µ > 0 such that:
• Given F (p) and firms’ (S, s) price rule, r satisfies equation (2);
• Given F (p) and r, firms’ price rule is a staggered (S, s) policy that satisfies inequality (3) and
the first-order conditions (4), (5);
• The market real-price distribution is stationary and is consistent with the individual firms’ stag-
gered (S, s) policy, that is, F (p) satisfies equation (1);
• 1/µ is determined by the free-entry condition (6).
Noting S ≤ r, the equilibrium solution µ, r, S, s, can be described by the following system of equations:
r = γ + EJ(p) (7)
S = min
[(
s+
ρβ
µλ
)
eλ − c(eλ − 1), r
]
(8)
s = c+
h
µλ
(9)
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and the free-entry condition (6). Condition for consumer search (7) is obtained by applying S ≤ r to
equation (2), where
EJ [p] = S
λ( sS − e−λ)
(1− e−λ)(λ− ln(Ss ))
∈ (s, S]
represents the lowest price consumers expect during search. Equation (8) is obtained by applying S ≤ r
to equation (4), and equation (9) is obtained by applying the free-entry condition (6) to equation (5).
In what follows, I use 1σ −1 ≡ (S− s)/s as a measure of price dispersion. A higher (or lower) value
of 1σ implies a larger (or smaller) dispersion of real prices.
9 Observe from equation (8) that there are
two cases: either S can be determined independent of the search reservation price r or not. In the
following two subsections, I show the existence and characterization of equilibrium for each case in
separation. Either type of equilibrium can emerge.
Finally, equation (9) shows that the lower bound of real-prices s is increasing in the number of
firms 1/µ. This means, individual firms compensate a smaller expected profit, driven by entry of firms,
by setting the trigger value s at a higher level. This positive relationship holds irrelevant of how the
upper bound S is determined.
3.2 Equilibrium without binding reservation price
I shall first consider the case with S < r. In this case, the real-price band (S, s) is determined regardless
of the consumer reservation price r. As will be discussed in detail later, this equilibrium has essentially
a similar property to Fishman’s [1992], so I will refer to it as F-type equilibrium.
Definition 2 (F-type equilibrium) Define:
ΩF ≡
{
(γ, β, h, c, g, ρ) ∈ (0,∞)6, λ ∈ [1,∞) s.t. S < r} .
If {γ, β, h, c, λ, g, ρ} ∈ ΩF , then define an F-type equilibrium to be the steady-state equilibrium in
Definition 1.
The equilibrium value of µ, S, s for an F-type is determined by equations (6), (8), (9) that satisfy
S < r. The standard fixed-point argument implies the existence of equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (Existence of F-type equilibrium) Suppose {γ, β, h, c, λ, g, ρ} ∈ ΩF . Then, there
exists an F-type equilibrium that satisfies: µ ∈ (0,∞) and r > S > s > c.
Given {γ, β, h, c, λ, g, ρ} ∈ ΩF , Theorem 1 establishes the existence of an F-type equilibrium.
Notice ΩF is non-empty. In an F-type equilibrium, price-competition binds effectively the target value
9Lemma 2 in Be´nabou [1988] proves that the coefficient of variation is monotone in 1/σ for the log-uniform distribution.
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S of individual firms. The role played by price competition can be captured by the price elasticity of
expected number of sales, which is given by α ≡ dD(p)/dpD(p)/p = λln(1/σ) . Note α is increasing in λ and
decreasing in 1/σ. This means, the more price quotations consumers observe on average, the more
price sensitive consumers are and the more elastic demand a firm faces. Conversely, the more dispersed
market prices are, the less price sensitive consumers are and the less elastic demand a firm faces.
There are two important properties of the F-type equilibrium concerning the relationship between
price dispersion, the number of firms, and the average level of market prices. First, equations (9), (11)
yield:
1
σ
=
c+ eλ(h+ ρβ)/µλ
c+ h/µλ
(10)
which shows the positive relationship between the price dispersion 1/σ and the number of firms 1/µ.
This reflects the fact that when price dispersion is larger, firms face a less elastic expected demand.
Given firms’ pricing is free from the search-reservation price (i.e., r > S), a less elastic expected demand
lets individual firms set the target value S at a higher level, and the resulting higher expected-profits
stimulate entry of firms.
Second, applying the free-entry condition (6) to the first order conditions (4) yields:
S = c+
eλ(h+ ρβ)
µλ
. (11)
S is increasing in 1/µ. Since s is also increasing in 1/µ, the entire real-price band is at a higher level
when there are a larger number of firms.
Finally, it is instructive to compare the role played by price-competition in the F-type equilibrium
with that considered in Fishman’s [1992]. Both share a common mechanism through which price
competition binds firms’ price-adjustment strategies. In Fishman’s model, however, consumers observe
more than one price quotations with probability one. In this case, firms know that any consumers
observe the rival’s price without fail, making the Bertrand undercutting dictate the equilibrium. In his
model, the price-competition ensures equal profits in equilibrium only by itself, while the equilibrium
price dispersion arises solely from real price erosions (due to inflation) and adjustment costs. In
contrast, my model retains a monopolistic element in pricing, because consumers might observe only
one price. There is still room for high-price firms to survive due to the presence of some consumers
who find only their price and not others. This opens up a room for an equilibrium interaction between
the price dispersion and the number of firms.
3.3 Equilibrium with binding reservation price
Consider next the case with S = r. In this case, the search reservation price effectively binds the upper
bound S of market prices. This equilibrium has essentially a similar property to the equilibrium with
binding reservation price studied in Be´nabou’s [1988], so I will refer to it as B-type equilibrium.
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Definition 3 (B-type equilibrium) Define:
ΩB ≡
{
(γ, β, h, c, g, ρ) ∈ (0,∞)6, λ ∈ [1,∞) s.t. S = r} .
If {γ, β, h, c, λ, g, ρ} ∈ ΩB, then define a B-type equilibrium to be the steady-state equilibrium in Defi-
nition 1.
Given that equation (8) holds with S = r, the equilibrium value of S, s µ, in a B-type equilibrium
is determined by equations (6), (7), (9). The standard fixed-point argument implies the existence of
equilibrium.
Theorem 2 (Existence of B-type equilibrium) Suppose {γ, β, h, c, λ, g, ρ} ∈ ΩB. Then, there
exists a B-type equilibrium that satisfies: µ ∈ (0,∞) and S = r > s > c.
Given {γ, β, h, c, λ, g, ρ} ∈ ΩB , Theorem 2 establishes the existence of a B-type equilibrium. Notice
ΩB is non-empty. Equations (7), (9) yield:
1
σ
=
γ
(c+ h/µλ) (1− L(1/σ)) (12)
where L(1/σ) ≡ EJ [p]S = λ(σ−e
−λ)
(1−e−λ)(λ−ln( 1σ ))
is strictly decreasing in 1/σ. The R.H.S. of the above
equation is strictly decreasing in both 1/σ and 1/µ. Hence, opposite to F-type equilibrium, the B-
type equilibrium implies the negative relationship between price dispersion and the number of firms.
This reflects the fact that as price dispersion becomes larger, consumers expect a lower price to observe
during search. Given S = r, this implies individual firms must set the target value S at a lower level.
The resulting lower expected-profits lead to exit of some firms, which continues till the remaining
firms’ expected-profits cover the fixed costs, to satisfy the free-entry condition (6).
As in F-type equilibrium, the level of entire price-band is strictly increasing in the number of firms
in a B-type equilibrium. Remembering that the lower bound s is increases in 1/µ, this can be seen by
noting from equation (7) or S = γ1−L(1/σ) that the upper bound S is increasing in 1/µ.
4 Comparative statics
The analysis so far has established the existence of the steady-state equilibrium, and an important
difference in the equilibrium properties: in an F-type equilibrium, the upper bound of real prices S is
bounded by price-competition among firms, and a change in price dispersion has a positive effect on the
average real price and the number of firms; in a B-type equilibrium, S is bounded by the consumers’
search reservation price, and a change in price dispersion has a negative effect on the average real price
and the number of firms.
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In this section, I use numerical simulations of the model for comparative statics on two important
parameters, λ and g. For simulation exercises, the baseline parameters I have chosen are: γ = 0.01,
β = 1.5, h = 15.0, c = 1.0, λ = 1.4, ρ = 0.05, g = 0.03. Although the purpose is not to calibrate any
specific evidence, implicit here is to generate a small menu cost relative to expected profits over the
price-cycle. I chose the set of parameters to generate β/
∫ S
s
(p − c)D(p)dp = 0.027.10 Under this set
of parameters, the equilibrium is in the F-type. The results presented here are robust to the choice of
parameters.
To illustrate how a switch of the type of equilibrium can occur, suppose that equilibrium is initially
in the F-type, that is, {γ, β, h, c, λ, g, ρ} ∈ ΩF . Differentiation of equation (7) yields:
dr
d (1/σ)
=
dS
d (1/σ)
L(1/σ) + S
dL(1/σ)
d (1/σ)
. (13)
In the RHS of this equation, the first term is positive and the second term is negative. This shows,
there exist two opposing effects of an increase in price dispersion on the reservation price r. On the
one hand, a larger price dispersion implies a less elastic expected demand to firms and hence leads to a
higher average market price (i.e., dS/d(1/σ) > 0). This effect increases the consumers reservation price
r. On the other hand, a larger price dispersion implies a higher marginal expected gain to consumers
from one search (i.e., dL(1/σ)/d(1/σ) < 0). This effect decreases r. Thus, if r increases with 1/σ in
an F-type equilibrium, its increment must be less than that of S. Hence, if the equilibrium switches
to the B-type equilibrium (i.e., S = r), then there must be a sufficiently large price dispersion.
4.1 Consumers’ search technology
Taking g as given, I first examine comparative statics with respect to λ. The following result provides
a useful benchmark.
Proposition 1 The steady-state equilibrium is in the F-type in the limit as λ → ∞ and satisfies:
1/µ→ 0, S → c, s→ c, r → γ + c, 1/σ → 1 as λ→∞.
The result shows an equilibrium is in the F-type when λ takes high values.
Figure 1(a) - 1(b) plot simulation results for the responses of real prices r, S,EF (p), s and the
number of firms 1/µ to changes in λ. EF (p) denotes the average market price. The figures show that
all real prices, price dispersion and the number of firms decrease with λ. The underlying mechanism is
that a larger λ implies a more elastic expected demand and intensifies price competition among firms.
10Levy, Bergen, Dutta, and Venable [1997] estimate the size of manu costs measured in terms of labor units, on the
basis of direct observation of the price changing process in several large US grocery chains during 1991-1992. They report
that the total menu cost is 0.7% of the entire revenue and 2.8% of the gross margin. The annual inflation rate during
this time period was 3%. In a related firm-level study, Zbaracki et. al. [2004] find that managerial costs (information
gathering, decision making, and communication costs) and customers costs (communication and negotiation costs) of
price adjustment are significantly larger than physical menu costs.
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Figure 1: Search Technology, Real Prices, and Number of Firms
This makes individual firms’ price adjustments smaller and more frequent, and induces exit of firms.
Hence, both the average market price and price dispersion decrease with λ.11
Result 1 As consumers observe a larger number of price quotations on average, the average real
price, price dispersion and the number of firms all decrease, while price adjustments by individual
firms become smaller and more frequent, and vice versa.
Result 1 is consistent with a set of empirical findings on individual markets mentioned in the
introductory section. Internet commerce, in which consumers have improved search technologies, leads
to more frequent and smaller price adjustments by individual firms, more elastic demand, a higher
concentration ratio, and lower prices.12 Interpreting λ as an average search intensity of consumers,
which varies across markets, the negative relationship between search intensity and price is consistent
with Sorensen’s [2000] findings that a larger search intensity reduces price dispersion in retail markets
for prescription drugs.
4.2 Inflation
To present comparative statics results on g, the following proposition provides a useful benchmark.
11The results remain the same even when the equilibrium is in a B-type region, which emerges for lower value of λ
with assuming another parameter values, for example, a lower value of γ, h and/or a higher value of g, β. Numerical
tables for these cases are available upon request from the author.
12Brown and Goolsbee [2000] and Scott, Morton and Zettlemeyer [2002] find Internet leads to lower prices for life
insurance and for cars, respectively.
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Proposition 2 The F-type equilibrium satisfies: 1/µ → 0, S → c, s → c, r → γ + c, 1/σ → 1 as
g → 0. Further, the steady-state equilibrium is in the B-type in the limit as g → ∞ and satisfies:
1/µ ∈ (0,∞), S = r > s > c, 1/σ → 1/σ+ ∈ (0,∞) as g →∞.
Supposing that equilibrium is initially in the F-type, Proposition 2 shows that a switch of the type
of equilibrium from the F-type to the B-type occurs at some g ∈ (0,∞). It will become clear shortly
that the results below are essentially the same even if I suppose equilibrium is initially in the B-type,
given that an F-type equilibrium emerges for large values of λ as shown above.
Inflation, real prices, and the number of firms: Figure 2(a) - 2(b) plot numerical results for the
responses of real prices r, S,EF (p), s, and the number of firms 1/µ to changes in the rate of inflation
g. The figures show a clear occurrence of the equilibrium switching: an equilibrium is the F-type for
low values of g but is the B-type for high values of g. An increase in g leads to an increase in price
dispersion.13 A larger price dispersion implies a less elastic expected demand to firms, and a larger
expected return of search to consumers. As already mentioned, these two effects work oppositely on
the consumer reservation price r, hence the upper bound S increases more than r (see equation (13)).
In the benchmark case with λ = 1.4, S = r for g ≥ 20.9%. As g increases, all real prices and the
number of firms increase in the F-type region but decrease in the B-type region. Hence, an equilibrium
switching displays non-monotonic responses of equilibrium to an increase in g.
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Figure 2: Inflation, Real Prices, and Number of Firms (λ = 1.4)
13For empirical evidence on the positive relationship between inflation and price dispersion, see Vining and Elwertowski
[1976], Lach and Tsiddon [1992], and Eden [2001] for example.
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Figure 3(a) - 3(d) plot simulation results on real prices with λ = 1.1, λ = 1.5, λ = 2.0, λ = 2.5
respectively. These figures show that an equilibrium switches at a lower (or higher) level of g when λ
takes a lower (or higher) value. For λ = 1.1, after large increases in real prices in the F-type region, a
switch occurs at g = 5.6% above which all real prices decrease with g; for λ = 1.5, 2.0, a switch occurs
at g = 27.1%, 68.2% respectively; while for λ = 2.5 all real prices increase with g ≤ 100% within
which a switch does not occur. The dependence of the non-monotonicity on λ is intuitive. When λ is
low (or high), the amount of price competition among firms is small (or large) so that individual firms
make a larger (or smaller) price-increase in response to an increase in g. As a result, when λ is low
the upper bound S increases readily to reach r as g increases, whereas when λ is high the equilibrium
remains in the F-type region for a wide range of g.
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Figure 3: Inflation, Real Prices, and Number of Firms (λ = 1.1, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5)
Finally, the non-monotonicity result is significantly sensitive to values of λ. To confirm this point,
I have calculated the elasticity of the turning point inflation rate with respect to a change in pa-
rameters. Denote this elasticity by g∗i for parameter i ∈ {λ, γ, β, h}. Lower search costs γ, higher
price-adjustment costs β, or lower entry costs h all contribute to make an equilibrium switching arise
at a lower inflation rate. However, their effects are quantitatively small relative to λ: g∗γ = 0.29,
g∗β = −0.05, and g∗h = 0.02, while g∗λ = 0.74. 14 The overall results can be summarized as follows.
14The elasticity of the turning point inflation rate is defined as g∗i ≡
(g¯ij+1−g¯ij )/g¯ij
(ij+1−ij)/ij where g¯ij represents the turning
point inflation rate for the jth value of a parameter i. The number reported is averaged over a parameter interval that
satisfies g¯ij ∈ (0, 1.000], which is found to be γ = (0, 0.06], β = (0, 5.5], h = (0, 20.1], and λ = (1, 2.3] respectively.
The result is robust to any choice of this parameter interval.
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Result 2 An increase in the rate of inflation increases price dispersion, and is more likely to increase
the average real price and the number of firms when consumers observe a larger number of price
quotations on average, and vice versa. Further, the impact of inflation on real prices and firms’
entry-exit behaviors is significantly sensitive to parameter for consumers’ search technologies λ.
Inflation and resource costs: In this economy, the overall resource costs are the total of menu
costs and fixed costs, given by 1µ
(
h+ βT
)
. Entry of firms, i.e., a higher 1/µ, implies larger total fixed
costs, and a more frequent price-adjustment by individual firms, i.e., a higher 1/T , implies larger total
menu costs. Figure 4(a) plots numerical results on the responses of total resource costs to changes
in g. An increase in g induces entry of firms and increases total resource costs in the F-type region,
whereas it induces exit of firms and decreases total resource costs in the B-type region. This result
reflects the fact that the contributions of menu costs are minor. Noting the equilibrium is the F-type
for a wider range of g when λ takes a higher value, the result can be summarized as follows.
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Figure 4: Inflation, Resource Costs, and Frequency of Price Adjustments
Result 3 An increase in the inflation rate is more likely to increase the total resource costs spent on
entry and price-adjustments when consumers observe a larger number of price quotations on average,
and vice versa.
Inflation and the frequency of price adjustments: Figure 4(b) plots numerical results for the
responses of the frequency of price-adjustments 1/T to changes in g. In the present framework, inflation
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affects 1/T through the following two channels: directly, an increase in g increases the speed at which
real prices hits the lower bound s, which shortens the length of time that nominal price remains fixed,
T ≡ ln(1/σ)/g; indirectly, an increase in g leads to a larger size of price adjustments by individual
firms, which decreases the frequency of price adjustments, 1/T .15 The result shows that the latter
effect is relatively stronger than the former effect in the F-type region, whereas the former effect is
relatively stronger than the latter effect in the B-type region. This reflects an aggregate feedback effect
on 1/T present in the B-type equilibrium: exit of some firms, if induced by an increased willingness to
search, partially restores the average market shares of the remaining firms and motivates them to make
smaller and more frequent price-adjustments. Consequently, an increase in g leads to less frequent
price adjustments in the F-type region, but to more frequent price adjustments in the B-type region.
For λ = 1.1, prices are adjusted every 16.7, 8.8, 1.8, 0.03 weeks for the annual inflation rate g = 1%,
10%, 50%, 100%, while for λ = 1.4 and 1.8, the corresponding durations are 4.6, 4.6, 1.7, 0.8 weeks
and 1.8, 1.8, 1.6, 0.8 weeks, respectively. Because a B-type equilibrium emerges at a higher inflation
rate and lower values of λ, the result can be summarized as follows.16
Result 4 An increase in the inflation rate is likely to yield more frequent price-adjustments by in-
dividual firms when consumers observe a smaller number of price quotations on average, and vice
versa.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the relationship between search market behaviors and price competition in an
inflationary economy. I extended Be´nabou’s [1988] seminal work by using a noisy sequential search
model developed by Burdett and Judd [1983]. A novel insight into the consequence of expected
inflation has been obtained: an inflation is more likely to increase monopoly power of firms and to
stimulate entry of firms in markets where consumers’ search technologies to observe firms’ prices are
more efficient, and vice versa.
The model has also delivered a couple of new empirical implications on firms’ price setting behav-
iors. Result 1 provides a testable hypothesis: given the rate of inflation, demand is more elastic in
markets where consumers search technologies are more efficient, and hence firms’ price adjustments
are smaller and more frequent. This is consistent with the existing evidence on digital economy, and
15In partial equilibrium (S, s) models in which the demand function is exogenously given, the relationship between
inflation, real prices, and the frequency of price adjustments depends on the curvature of the profit function. See
Konieckzny [1990, 1993] and Be´nabou and Konieckzny [1994].
16The empirical evidence concerning the frequency in individual markets is not convergent, ranging from a week
on average (Ariga, Matsui, Watanabe [2001] and Dutta, Bergen, Levy, and Venable [1999]) to 11 months on average
(Kashyap [1995]) to 3-7 years (Cecchetti [1986]). Wolman [2000] provides an excellent survey of this literature. Recently,
Bils and Klenow [2004] find the average frequency is about three months in the US, and Dhyne et al [2005] find it more
than six months in Europe.
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observations by Carlton [1986] and Caucutt, Gosh and Kelton [1999] that firms’ price changes are
more frequent in more competitive markets where demand is more elastic. It is important to note that
Bils and Klenow [2004] find this relationship is not robust. The result obtained in my paper (Result
4) also suggests that this relationship can be altered once inflation and the macroeconomic effects are
taken into consideration.
A recent work by Konieczny and Skrzypacz [2006] finds an interesting evidence that shows firms’
price adjustments are more frequent and smaller when consumers’ search is more intensive. Using
several commodity characteristics as a proxy, they show that consumers’ search intensity that varies
across the units of purchases, can explain the relationship between inflation and the frequency of price
adjustments observed in high inflation economies. In contrast to their formulation, varying search in-
tensities introduced in my model reflect market characteristics rather than commodity characteristics.
It will be interesting to test if the difference in the notion of search intensity yields similar or different
empirical outcomes. I will leave a closer look at these empirical issues for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that a sample contains n price quotations drawn from the distribution F (p), where n ≥ 1
is a positive integer and F (p) is well-defined and has no mass point. Given that any price observed
is an independent random variable, the probability that the lowest price in the n sampled prices is
greater than a price p is given by (1 − F (p))n. Then 1 − (1 − F (p))n represents the probability that
the lowest price in the n sampled prices is no greater than p. From the assumption that n follows a
Poisson distribution with λ, it follows that:
Pr[the lowest price in n prices ≤ p]
=
∞∑
n=1
Pr[n prices are sampled]× Pr[the lowest price in n prices ≤ p]
=
∞∑
n=1
e−λλn
n!
[1− (1− F (p))n]
= 1−
∞∑
n=0
e−λ(1−F (p)) [λ(1− F (p))]n
n!
e−λF (p)
= 1− e−λF (p)
Noting that the Poisson probability e
−λλn
n! is defined over n = 0, 1, 2, ..., the distribution of the lowest
price conditional on n ≥ 1 that is faced by consumers can be derived as follows:
J(p) =
Pr[the lowest price in n prices ≤ p]
Pr[n ≥ 1] =
1− e−λF (p)
1− e−λ
where I used Pr[n ≥ 1] = 1− Pr[n = 0] = 1− e−λ. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
If p > r, then D(p) = 0 due to the reservation-price nature of demand. If p ≤ r, then noting that the
density of consumers who observe a firm’s price is given by µn leads to:
D(p) =
∞∑
n=1
µn× Pr[n prices are observed]× Pr[p is the lowest price in n prices]
= µ
∞∑
n=1
e−λλn
n!
n(1− F (p))n−1
= µλ
∞∑
n=0
e−λ(1−F (p))(λ(1− F (p)))n
n!
e−λF (p)
= µλe−λF (p).
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 3
If p > r, then Π(p) = 0. If p ≤ r, then define pˆ to be the price that satisfies dΠ(p)dp |p=pˆ= 0. Applying
dF (p)/dp = 1/p ln(1/σ) for all p ∈ [s, S] (see equation (1)), it is immediate that pˆ = λcλ−ln(1/σ) . A
straightforward algebra implies:
d2Π(p)
dp2
∣∣∣
p=pˆ
= −µλ2e−λF (pˆ)
[
dF (p)
dp
∣∣∣
p=pˆ
+ (pˆ− c)d
2F (p)
dp2
∣∣∣
p=pˆ
]
= −µλ2e−λF (pˆ) c/ˆp
2
ln(1/σ)
< 0.
Hence, Π(p) is strictly quasi-concave in p ∈ [0, r]. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
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Proof of Lemma 4
Begin with the optimality of S′ ≤ r. Suppose S′ > r. Then the corresponding value function, denoted
as W =W (S′, s′), can be written as
W = −β +
∫ T ′
ω
Π(re−g(t−ω))e−ρtdt+We−ρT
′
,
where Π(re−g(t−ω)) = µλe−λF (re
−g(t−ω))(re−g(t−ω) − c) and ω ≡ ln(S′/r)/g represents a time interval
for no sales. Notice any sales will be made only when ω < T ′ = ln(S′/s′)/g. Now, consider a deviation
by the firm who adjusts its price to r instead of S′ at some point in time and then resumes the
original (S′, s′) policy (described above) after a time T ′ − ω. This deviation yields a payoff denoted
as X = X(r, s′) given by:
X = −β +
∫ T ′−ω
0
Π(re−gt)e−ρtdt+We−ρ(T
′−ω) = −β +
[∫ T ′
ω
Π(re−g(t−ω))e−ρtdt+We−ρT
′
]
eρω.
The latter expression implies X + β = (W + β)eρω and hence X > W , which shows that S′ > r is
never optimal.
Given S′ ≤ r and Lemma 3, the optimality and uniqueness of the (S′, s′) price policy can be shown
by using the procedure developed by Sheshinski and Weiss [1977], that is, by rewriting V = V (S′, s′)
as follows:
V =
1
g(S
′ ρ
g − s′ ρg )
[
−βgS′ ρg +
∫ S′
s′
Π(z)z−1+
ρ
g dz
]
,
where z ≡ S′e−gt and Π(z) = µλe−λF (z)(z − c). This expression allows one to obtain the first order
conditions (4), (5). Further, the second-order conditions are satisfied due to the strictly quasi-concavity
of Π(p) as shown in Lemma 3. Hence, the optimal solution (S′, s′) is unique. This completes the proof
of Lemma 4.
Proof of Theorem 1
The analysis so far has established that equations (6), (7), (8), (9) describe the necessary and sufficient
conditions for an F-type equilibrium given {γ, β, h, c, λ, g, ρ} ∈ ΩF . All that remains here is to find a
solution µ, r, S, s to these conditions. The proof takes two steps. Assuming r > S, Step 1 establishes
a solution µ ≥ 0 to equations (8), (9) for σ ≡ sS ∈ [σ∗, 1], where σ∗ ∈ (0, 1). Let µ = µ(σ) denote this
solution. Using µ = µ(σ) obtained and equation (8), Step 2 solves the value function V = V (S, s) for
σ ∈ [0, 1]. With a slight abuse of notation, let V (µ(σ), σ) denote this solution. An equilibrium is then
identified by noting that equation (6) requires that σ must satisfy the fixed point condition,
V (µ(σ), σ) =
h
ρ
, (14)
where h/ρ is a positive constant. Step 2 then shows there exists a solution σ ∈ (σ∗, 1) to this condition
(14). Applying σ obtained to µ = µ(σ) identifies an equilibrium value of µ ∈ (0,∞), which further
identifies an equilibrium value of S > s > c. Applying these values to equation (7), an equilibrium
value for r > S can be identified by choosing a set of parameters that satisfies γ > S (1− L(1/σ)),
where L(1/σ) ≡ EJ [p]S = λ(σ−e
−λ)
(1−e−λ)(λ−ln(1/σ)) . Note ΩF is non-empty since the RHS of this inequality
is bounded. By construction, this solution satisfies equations (6), (7), (8), (9) and r > S, and hence
describes an F-type equilibrium.
Step 1 Equations (8), (9) solve for µ = µ(σ) ≥ 0 that is continuous and strictly increasing in σ ∈ (0, 1)
and satisfies: µ(σ) = 0 when σ = σ∗ ≡ e−λhh+ρβ and µ(σ)→∞ as σ → 1.
Proof of Step 1. The claim is immediately shown from equation (10), which is constructed by
equations (8), (9). This completes the proof of Step 1.
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Step 2 There exists a solution σ ∈ (σ∗, 1) to the fixed point condition (14).
Proof of Step 2. The value function V = V (S, s) given in the text can be written as follows:
V =
−β + µλ ln(1/σ) (SΘs(σ)− cΘc(σ))
1− σ ρg
(15)
where
Θs(σ) ≡ σ
ρ+g
g − e−λ
λg − (ρ+ g) ln(1/σ) ; Θc(σ) ≡
σ
ρ
g − e−λ
λg − ρ ln(1/σ) .
Notice Θs(σ),Θc(σ) > 0 for any σ ∈ (0, 1) and limΘs(σ) = limΘc as σ → 1. Substituting out S in V
using equation (8) and σ ≡ s/S, and applying the solution µ = µ(σ) established in Step 1, the fixed
point condition (14) can be written as follows:
ΛF (σ) ≡
β
(
1 + ρ ln(1/σ)Θs(σ)
σ−e−λ
)
+
(
1− σ ρg
)
h/ρ
1−e−λ
σ−e−λΘs(σ)−Θc(σ)
= cµ(σ)λ ln(1/σ) (16)
ΛF (σ) is continuous in σ ∈ (0, 1). When σ = σ∗, note the numerator of ΛF (σ∗) becomes:
h
ρ
(
1
η
− e−λ ρg η ρg
)(
1− λ+ ln(1/η)
λ+ ρ+gρ ln(1/η)
)
> 0
where η ≡ hh+ρβ < 1. Since the denominator of ΛF (σ∗) is negative, it follows that: ΛF (σ∗) < 0 =
cµ(σ∗)λ ln(1/σ∗). Further, applying the l’ Hospital’s rule once yields:
lim cµ(σ)λ ln(1/σ) = cλ lim
dµ
dσ
σ (ln(1/σ))2 = eλ(h+ ρβ)− h as σ → 1
where the last equality can be obtained by using equation (10). This leads to: cµ(σ)λ ln(1/σ) <
ΛF (σ) → +∞ as σ → 1. Therefore, there exists σ ∈ (σ∗, 1) that satisfies equation (16). This
completes the proof of Step 2.
Proof of Theorem 2
First of all, Theorem 1 implies that there exists a set of parameters such that γ = S (1− L(1/σ)) holds,
so ΩB is non empty. Hence, the proof is to find a solution µ, S, s to equations (6), (7),(9) that satisfy
S = r. The proof follows from a similar two-step approach as before. Given S = r, Step 1 establishes
a solution µ ≥ 0 to equations (7), (9) for σ ≡ sS ∈ [σ+, 1], where σ+ ∈ (0, 1). Viewing equation (6)
as a fixed point requirement, Step 2 finds a fixed point σ ∈ (σ+, 1) by using the solution obtained in
Step 1 and equation (7). This solution further identifies an equilibrium solution of µ ∈ (0,∞) and
S = r > s > c. Hence, Step 1 and 2 establish that there exists an equilibrium solution S = r, s, µ that
satisfies equations (6), (7), (9) and by construction, this solution describes a B-type equilibrium.
Step 1 Equations (7), (9) solve for µ = µ(σ) ≥ 0 that is continuous and strictly decreasing in
σ ∈ (0, 1) and satisfies: µ(σ) → ∞ as σ → σ+ ∈ (0, 1) and µ(σ) → 0 as σ → 1, where σ+ is a unique
solution to γσ+ = c (1− L(1/σ+)).
Proof of Step 1. The claim is immediately shown from equation (12), which is constructed by
equations (7), (9). This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2 Given µ = µ(σ) established in Step 1, there exists a solution σ ∈ (σ+, 1) that satisfies
equations (6),(7),(9).
21
Proof of Step 2. Substituting out S in V from equation (15) by using equation (7), and applying
the solution µ = µ(σ) established in Step 1, the fixed point requirement V = h/ρ can be written as
follows:
ΛB(σ) ≡
β +
(
1− σ ρg
)
h/ρ
ln(1/σ)
(
γ
1−L(1/σ)Θs(σ)− cΘc(σ)
) = µ(σ)λ. (17)
ΛB(σ) is continuous in σ ∈ (0, 1). It is immediate that: ΛB(σ) < µ(σ)λ as σ → σ+. Further, applying
the l’ Hospital’s rule once yields
lim
γ ln(1/σ)
1− L(1/σ) =
λγ(1− e−λ)
λ− 1 + e−λ as σ → 1
which leads to limΛB(σ) =
β(λ−1+e−λ)
λγ(1−e−λ) > 0 = limµ(σ)λ as σ → 1. Therefore, there exists σ ∈ (σ+, 1)
that satisfies equation (17). This completes the proof of Step 2.
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that the equilibrium in the B-type as λ → ∞. There are two cases. Suppose first σ < 1 as
λ → ∞. Then, noting limΩs(σ) = limΩc(σ) = 0 and limL(1/σ) = σ as λ → ∞ for any σ ∈ [0, 1]
yields: σ < 1 as λ→∞ implies ΛB(σ)→∞ as λ→∞. However, equations (7), (9) imply µ(σ)λ <∞
as λ → ∞, hence σ < 1 as λ → ∞ contradicts to the fixed point condition (17). Suppose next
limσ = 1 as λ→∞. In this case again, noting ΛB(σ)→∞ > µ(σ)λ as λ→∞ yields a contradiction
to (17). Hence, the equilibrium is not the B-type as λ→∞.
Suppose next that the equilibrium in the F-type as λ → ∞. Then, observe that limσ = 1 as
λ→∞ implies:
e−λ(1− σ)
(
1− σ
σ − e−λΩs(σ)− Ωc(σ)
)
ΛF (σ) = e−λ(1− σ)
{
β
(
1 +
ρ ln(1/σ)Ωs(σ)
σ − e−λ
)
+
(
1− σ ρg
) h
ρ
}
→ 0
as λ→∞ and
e−λ(1− σ)
(
1− σ
σ − e−λΩs(σ)− Ωc(σ)
)
cµ(σ)λ ln(1/σ)
= e−λ(1− σ)
(
1−σ
σ−e−λΩs(σ)− Ωc(σ)
)
c
(
σ(h+ ρβ)− he−λ) ln(1/σ)→ 0
as λ→∞, and hence satisfies the fixed point condition (16). The rest of the statements in proposition
are immediate from applying limσ = 1 as λ → ∞ to equations (8),(9). This completes the proof of
Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Noting Ωs(σ) = Ωc(σ) as g → 0 for any σ ∈ [σ∗, 1] implies that limσ = 1 as g → 0 satisfies the fixed
point condition (16). Applying σ → 1 as g → 0 yields the rest of the statements in the first claim in
proposition. To prove the second claim, suppose first that the equilibrium is the F-type as g → ∞.
Note limΩs(σ) = limΩc(σ) = 0 as g → ∞ for any σ ∈ [σ∗, 1], and hence ΛF (σ) → ∞ as g → ∞. As
shown in Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 1, remember that the R.H.S. of the fixed point condition (16)
does not depend on g and satisfies cµ(σ)λ ln(1/σ) < ∞ for any σ ∈ [σ∗, 1]. This leads to the desired
contradiction, hence the equilibrium is not the F-type as g →∞.
Suppose next the equilibrium is the B-type as g → ∞. Then, it is immediate that limσ = σ+ as
g →∞ satisfies the fixed point condition (17). Applying σ → σ+ as g →∞ to equations (7),(9) yields
the rest of the statements in the second claim. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
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